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The Psychological Demands of Work The Nature ofContemporary Jobs As technology advances, there are corresponding changes in the kind of task which men are required to do as part of their ordinary work. Once, they looked directly at the product their factory was making, and acted upon it with their hands or through simple mechanical linkages. Now, they may be facing electronic and instrumental displays and taking action by pressing buttons or moving the control levers of complex servo-systems. The demands of this kind of job are somewhat different from those of traditional work. It is worth looking more analytically at the particular functions involved.
First, many of these jobs require large quantities of visual information to be scanned in search of some one item which is wanted. An instance of this is the use of television for surveillance of a number of places by a single watchman (Tickner & Poulton 1968 ). The actual problem may be the supervision of motorways through cameras placed upon the road, the watching of possible escape points in a prison, or the observation of a supermarket for shoplifters, or of tube stations for blocks in the flow of passengers. In each of these cases, the whole point of the system is that one man can watch a large number of different sources of information. He needs, therefore, to glance as fast as possible over scenes which are uninteresting only stopping when he finds something of value. The designer of the system has certain choices in the way he arranges the job; for example, there may be a separate screen for each camera in use, producing an enormous bank of small screens. Alternatively, there may be one single large screen which is switched from camera to camera; this again may be done automatically or at the choice of the watchman. The number of cameras to be watched by each man can be varied, and so can the actual arrangement of the screens. In all these choices, however, the best arrangement of the work will to some extent depend upon the kind of signal which is being sought. Thus, if one is looking for a moving object on a number of screens which should all show a motionless picture, as might be the case in keeping a security guard over a deserted building, the number of screens which can be watched may be quite large. If, however, a complex discrimination has to be made, such as observing a stationary car amongst the other stationary objects at the edge of a motorway, the operator can only watch relatively few screens. Scanning irrelevant items takes a time which depends on the complexity of the analysis needed to distinguish them from relevant ones. In terms of understanding the working of the brain, this means that large quantities of irrelevant information can be monitored by setting the nervous system to analyse only a few essential features of each item presented. The rest will not be analysed, and will have no effect upon the man; but the demand of the task depends very much on the difficulty of extracting the few essential features from each item, which will allow a decision about its importance (Neisser 1966) .
A particular example of this principle, which will be familiar to many, is the task of finding a particular dose of a particular drug, amongst a large array of labels for other drugs produced by the same firm. One can normally assume that each label has written on it all the information necessary to say whether it is, or is not, the one you want at this particular instant. If, however, this information is given simply in letters and figures, the finding of one particular drug in one particular dosage requires that all the irrelevant labels be read completely until the correct one is found. Such a process is bound to be fairly slow, and offers opportunity for error. If, however, one introduces a simple sensory difference between labels for one drug and labels for another, such as printing them in different colours, then the scanning of irrelevant labels can be carried out very fast, until the particular correct label is reached (Poulton 1964) .
The foregoing examples concern the case in which most of the information is irrelevant. But a second function which may be extremely important is the combination of evidence from several sources. This is perhaps seen most dramatically in the case of airline pilots, where the indications given to the pilot by the artificial horizon may differ very considerably in meaning, depending upon the reading of his airspeed indicator and the setting of his engine controls. The same principle may apply in process control, in traffic systems, or for that matter in the interpretation of market research reports. It is necessary in these cases to take evidence from one source, hold it in mind, and combine it with evidence from another source before reaching a final decision. This means that there are limits to the extent to which the job can be simplified for the man by allowing easy discarding of irrelevant information, as he cannot safely ignore some of the sources of evidence. In addition, there are experiments which show that, for some reason, the way human beings combine evidence differs fairly markedly from the kind of behaviour which a mathematician would regard as optimal (Phillips & Edwards 1966).
To put it concretely, suppose one considers a man who is trying to predict the chances of failure in completing a certain job by a certain time. He may be able to estimate very accurately the probability that a certain gauge reading on one machine will be followed by a breakdown of that machine within the crucial period. He may also be able to estimate accurately the chances that another machine will fail to complete an essential component on time. When, however, he tries to combine these two probabilities his intuitive judgment is likely to underestimate the overall chances of failure. To get an accurate answer, he would need to calculate probabilities like a statistician, or get a computer to do it for him. This kind of function, and others like it, means that the man must inevitably be assisted in his work by various kinds of mechanical device.
A third principle of advanced technology, however, is that automatic devices should not be left completely on their own. A particularly dramatic example of this rule is to be found in the space programme, where the standard procedure is to involve the astronaut deliberately in the total system, providing him with all kinds of semi-automatic devices, but leaving him the ultimate choice between them. The arguments for this can be illustrated by taking a simple example, the deployment of the landing parachute in the early Mercury flights (Voss 1961). If all went well, the parachute was released automatically by a pressure-sensitive device when the capsule descended to an appropriate altitude. There was, however, always a certain chance of failure of the release mechanism and, as a precaution against this, the pressure-sensitive device would also light a red lamp on the astronaut's console; this lamp was itself switched off by another device which detected whether the fairing of the parachute had in fact been released. When that happened, a green light was substituted for the red one. If a red light was showing the astronaut could release the fairing by another system.
However, each of these extra devices also carried a certain possibility of failure, as did the original pressure-sensitive system. Consequently it was in principle possible to get a green light although the parachute had not in fact been released, to get a red light although the parachute had been deployed, or to get no light at all whatever the state of the parachute. As a cross check, it was possible to examine another instrument which gave the rate of descent of the capsule, but of course this also might conceivably be at fault. At this stage, the astronaut could resort to the final test of looking through the window and seeing whether he could see a parachute out there.
In more general terms, the role of automatic devices is to carry out those functions which a man does badly; but within any reasonable limitations of cost and other factors there will always be a probability of error. By incorporating a human being into the system, one can guard against a variety of eventualities with a high standard of safety, since one can provide quite a large number of alternative systems and it is unlikely that all will fail. There are well-known examples where astronauts have retrieved dangerous situations by making use of these alternative systems.
The example of the space programme is perhaps a little flamboyant, and it is worth noticing that the same principles apply at a more familiar level, in the design of the new signalling system on the London Underground (Raffle & Sell 1970) . All going well, Underground trains now move over large sections such as the new Section ofOccupational Medicine with Section ofMeasurement in Medicine 705 Victoria Line without human action being needed to change the signals, points, &c. The operation of the system is controlled in pre-programmed fashion, according to the timetable. However, it is not realistic to expect a complete railway system to behave in exactly the same way day after day; defects are bound to develop in rolling stock, or some uncontrolled factor may interrupt the trains at a certain point. To take the most dramatic instance, there may be a suicide which blocks the lines. When this kind of thing happens, a human being has to intervene to put matters right, and in order to do so he needs to be provided with a number of actions which he can introduce to take care of the situation. Certainly he must be able to put particular signals to danger, to stop individual trains, and so on. But it is particularly useful if he can take one action which starts some process which continues without further attention from him. For example, he may be provided with a system which will stop all trains reaching a certain point on the line, set points and give signal indications for them to be transferred to the other track, and send them back in the opposite direction. If this can all be done automatically once he has taken the decision, it clearly saves a great deal of time for other purposes. Again, he may introduce at various junctions a process which sends each train reaching that junction in a direction corresponding to the message which accompanied that train from its original depot, regardless of what the timetable says should be happening at that time. While these automatic routines are running, the man can think up fresh actions, in order gradually to readjust the service and get it back to the timetable. Just like the astronaut, he needs a number of alternative systems to help him, but he decides which should operate.
The Balance ofOverand Under-employment In this last example, we reach the crux of the problems of this kind of modern work. So long as all is going well, the man in such a system has nothing to do. Yet we know that lack of stimulation and activity produces a low level of arousal of the nervous system, and consequent inefficiency, quite apart from the everyday experience that people become discontented with long periods of inactivity. For this reason, if for no other, one would wish to keep the number of men employed in the system down to the point where they are reasonably occupied by dealing with the occasional minor emergencies. Also, the system itself is justified economically by reduction of staff, or by carrying out larger-scale operations with the same staff. For both reasons, one does not have as many men handling the signalling of the Victoria Line, as one would if one had the old system of separate signal boxes. Yet when an emergency arises, this smaller number of men, with their mechanical assistance, has to handle the same complex problems as the numerous signalmen of the traditional system. Thus at the time of crisis the amount of information reaching a man, and the number of decisions he has to take, are both greater than they would have been in previous days.
There are data, now classic, which show that this is bound to lead to a breakdown of performance if conditions become too extreme (Conrad 1951 , 1955 , Mackworth & Mackworth 1956 ). It is plausible at first sight that a man can handle twice as many sources of information if each is sufficiently automated to require attention at only half the rate which it needed before modernization. But this is fallacious, if the various sources of information are statistically independent. The larger the number of things a man has to watch, the greater the danger that two of them will require action at exactly the same instant, and when this happens he has a substantial chance of failing at his job. So we cannot simply divide the number of working staff by the same factor as we have reduced the number of demands for action. Different remedial action is needed for the two kinds of difficulty. In the case of the underemployment of a man when the system is working perfectly, the obvious answer is to give him something else to do. However, this other job must be free from any time pressure, so that it can be left alone at times of crisis and resumed when the emergency is over. On the Underground system, the actual logging of the passage of the trains is at the time of writing still carried out by hand by the men, and this keeps them active to some extent at periods when they would otherwise have little to do. (It also has the merit of keeping them fully au fait with any developing changes in the running of the trains, and thus giving them the necessary background of accurate information when they come to take any action. On the other hand, it does still need to be done within a reasonable time after the event concerned, and it may seem perhaps slightly artificial, so that alternative solutions are worth keeping in mind.) There seems no inherent reason why this kind of extra task should be confined to the work which the main system is conducting, as long as it is easy to drop the secondary task in order to take up the main one at a time of crisis.
At the other end of the scale, it is important to realize that a man who is under-occupied for a great deal of his time may nevertheless suffer from over-load at a time of crisis. He must therefore have every possible aid to speed each of his operations, because at some periods he will be extremely short of time. The various techniques for improving displays and controls, which have been worked out by ergonomists over the years, must therefore be applied with special rigour, even though the controls may remain unused for hours each day.
If these methods of improving under-and over-load are used, the problem of under-arousal will to some extent be self-regulating, because the man will perform his extra task up to the level which he can manage, but no further. In the case of over-arousal, there is no natural limit to the amount of demand which a task may place upon the man, but there may well be a limit to the extent to which we can speed up his functioning by improvement of display, and of his control systems. We need, therefore, some means of assessment which will tell us when the man is being over-loaded by the temporary bursts of very demanding activity.
Methods of Assessment Broadly speaking, there are two methods of attack upon the problem of determining evidence of over-load: to calculate the load on the man from a logical analysis of the job; and to introduce some outside method of measurement which shows how heavily he is loaded. Each of these lines of attack has its limitations, but can probably be developed further, and should be.
An example of theoretical prediction is an approach used by Senders in the United States (Senders 1967 ). This approach takes as a starting point the principle of information theory that a continuously varying signal can be specified by sampling its value at a frequency twice the highest frequency present in the signal. In terms of some instrumental display, this suggests that each instrument must be observed by the man at an interval about half the minimum interval between important signals from that instrument. By performing such a calculation for each of the instruments in, say, an aircraft cockpit, by making plausible assumptions about the time necessary to read and interpret the instrument, one can then see whether the total amount of information being presented is greater than the time available for handling it. At a practical level, the approach used by Senders has had a certain amount of success, although its author would doubtless be the first to admit that there are a number of weaknesses in the method as it stands at present. For example, the assumptions about interpretation times and so on may be incorrect, the effects of intercorrelation between different instruments may become very complicated, and since the man himself is an element in the system, his own activity will alter the readings on the instruments. Yet his activity will certainly change, depending upon the particular set of instruments which faces him. Thus a kind of 'chicken and egg' problem begins to present itself. At an elementary level, it has been shown that one may change the time taken by telephone operators to handle each call arriving at their switchboard by imposing a different load of calls to be handled (Conrad 1956 ). These limitations mean that one should not assume that an analysis of this sort will solve all problems, but it is certainly a useful technique for making a first assessment of a situation, to be checked by trials before a system goes into service.
An example of the other technique of measuring the load on the man is the 'secondary task' technique. This supposes that the man has a certain amount of available capacity for doing jobs, which is to a great extent interchangeable: he can handle a limited amount of information in a given time, but that information can come from one very demanding task, from two less demanding tasks, from four or five very simple tasks, and so on. There is a certain amount of evidence for this assumption, although it is doubtless inadequate (Broadbent 1958) . If one wishes to know, therefore, how heavily loaded is a man with a job which leaves him some spare time, one may apply an extra task which will be sufficient to overload him. One then instructs him to do the secondary task only when he can, and then examines the size of the deterioration in the secondary task when the first task changes (Knowles 1963) . As a concrete example, consider the task of car driving, which is for the vast majority of the time performed without accident or mishap. It is extremely difficult therefore to show that different traffic situations are different in the loads they place upon the driver, since he brings the car back unscratched whether he is placed in a subjectively difficult or subjectively easy traffic situation. If, however, we give him another task, such as answering tape-recorded questions while he is driving, we can measure the efficiency with which this extra task is performed. Of course he is told, if he does not think of it himself, that any difficulty of driving should have priority over the auditory task. When such a method is used we find his efficiency at answering questions shows a clear and repeatable difference between heavy and light traffic (Brown 1962) . This technique of using secondary tasks has been applied in a variety of situations: one can show, for example, that performance on the secondary task of bus drivers when they are first learning to drive a bus, will predict quite well their success at passing out at the end of their training course (Brown 1966) . In situations other than driving, a secondary task also seems to relate fairly efficiently to the difficulty of the primary task. This method too has its dangers, Section ofOccupational Medicine with Section ofMeasuirement in Medicine 707 however, which must be watched. An obvious one is that the task used for measurement must be very carefully chosen to avoid interference of a simple mechanical kind with the main task; hence one uses spoken questions and answers for a driving task, whereas one might use visual presentation and written answers if one was studying the demands of an auditory task. Less obvious is the possibility that the need to carry out a second task may change the performance of the first. A clear instance of this is shown up, in a driving situation, by studies of the use of a radio-telephone while driving. Even when one excludes the mechanical factor of holding the telephone handset, it is possible to show that listening and speaking while driving do produce slight changes in the driving itself. If we set up an experimental situation, requiring a man to drive through very small gaps, we find that he comes to grief more frequently when using a radiotelephone than when driving with no such distraction (Brown et al. 1969) . Incidentally, the problem is not so much one of inability to drive through a gap of given size, but rather of overestimating one's ability and so being prepared to drive through a space which is too small.
Clearly, therefore, one has to be very cautious in applying a secondary task technique, and really it can only be done if the main task is one which can always be performed perfectly, the only problem being the assessment of the amount of spare time the man has available. As long as the limitations of the method are remembered, however, it can be a useful way of locating the times of stress within a task.
Conclusions
Modem methods of work, then, expose the worker to large quantities of incoming information. The methods used to display this information should be aimed at allowing the man to discard rapidly the irrelevant, and not merely to provide every possible relevant item. Mechanical assistance is essential for some functions, but this will mean that periods of underactivity will alternate with times of crisis and pressure. The former can be met by a secondary task with no time pressure, and the latter can be eased by using all possible improvements of display and control.
But there will still be a limit to the scale of crisis which any one man can handle, and this is hard to assess. Two methods are available: logical analysis of the requirements of the job, and direct measurement by adding another simultaneous task. Neither of these methods is perfect, and each must be used with some caution. Further techniques of assessing the limits of overload are therefore badly needed.
